CO129-590-25 Accounts of events leading up to surrender and subsequent treatment of prisoners- etc 23-4-1942 - 28-9-1943 — Page 96

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Government of the United Kingdom were placed in my hands for my personal perusal. I am at liberty to say that there is nothing in these communications which in my opinion invalidates this view". Copies of the published report were sent to you on June 12th and so are no doubt available for reference on these and other points in the Dominions Office.

3. It will be remembered that the Commissioner was seeking in reply to argumenta put forward by Counsel for the opposition (Colonel Drew) to establish the following case. The fact that the Canadian troops sent to Hong Kong were insufficiently trained for field fighting at the time of their departure can be justified on the grounds that there would be sufficient time to complete their training on board ship and after their arrival in Hong Kong. The Canadian Government relied principally on the United Kingdom Government for advice as to the situation and prospect of war in the Far East and the communications received from the United Kingdom Government did not contain anything which should alter the Canadian Government's readiness to send the troops, although they were not fully trained.

Immediately on the publication of the report Drew made a statement to the press summarized in my telegram No.1162 of June 6th indicating that in his view the findings of the Commissioner were in many respecta directly contrary to the evidence which had been placed before him. The developments in this situation have been reported in a series of telegrams which I have sent you. It was as a part of his campaign against the report that Drew wrote his letter to the Prime Minister on July 11th. It contains a lengthy and closely reasoned statement of all Drew's main criticisms of the report, and runs into 32 typescript pages. I am sending a copy of this letter by the next airmail. I need not trouble you with most of its details now, as they are concerned with the precise state of training of the Canadian troops and various other matters concerning their despatch to Hong Kong,

5. But one point on which Drew fixes is the Commissioner's roference to the telegrams from the United Kingdom Government and his comment on those messages. Drew contests the view that these should have made no difference to the carrying out of the Canadian Government's plan. He refers specifically to the long telegram of October 24th and argues that it contained definite warning that the situation in the Far East had deteriorated and that there was a possibility of early war with Japan. Drew follows this statement by arguing that the Canadian Government should therefore have reconsidered their proposal to send troops which were not fully trained to Kong Kong. I give relevant extracts from this letter in my immediately following telegram.

6.

At the same time as he sent this letter to the Prime Minister, Drew sent copies of it to the leaders of the three Opposition parties in the House of Commons, Mr. Hanson, Mr. Coldwell and Mr. Blackmore, indicating that he was in duty bound to do this because he had been Counsel for the Opposition at the enquiry, There was then a request by one of these leaders in Parliament that the Prime Minister should lay the letter on the table of the House. The Prime Minister gave some indication that he would be prepared to do this. Before doing it, however, he sought the advice of the Government Counsel at the enquiry, Mr. George Campbell, K. C. On the following day in

the